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Substance dependence is complex and multifactorial, with many distinct pathways
involved in both the development and subsequent maintenance of addictive behaviors.
Various cognitive mechanisms have been implicated, including impulsivity, compulsivity,
and impaired decision-making. These mechanisms are modulated by emotional processes,
resulting in increased likelihood of initial drug use, sustained substance dependence,
and increased relapse during periods of abstinence. Emotional traits, such as
sensation-seeking, are risk factors for substance use, and chronic drug use can result
in further emotional dysregulation via effects on reward, motivation, and stress systems.
We will explore theories of hyper and hypo sensitivity of the brain reward systems that
may underpin motivational abnormalities and anhedonia. Disturbances in these systems
contribute to the biasing of emotional processing toward cues related to drug use at the
expense of natural rewards, which serves to maintain addictive behavior, via enhanced
drug craving.Wewill additionally focus on the sensitization of the brain stress systems that
result in negative affect states that continue into protracted abstinence that is may lead
to compulsive drug-taking. We will explore how these emotional dysregulations impact
upon decision-making controlled by goal-directed and habitual action selections systems,
and, in combination with a failure of prefrontal inhibitory control, mediate maladaptive
decision-making observed in substance dependent individuals such that they continue
drug use in spite of negative consequences. An understanding of the emotional impacts
on cognition in substance dependent individuals may guide the development of more
effective therapeutic interventions.
Keywords: addiction, emotion, cognition, reward, stress, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Drug addiction is a persistent disorder characterized by
compulsive-seeking and taking of drugs, loss of control over
intake, and negative emotional states in withdrawal, such as dys-
phoria, anxiety, and irritability (Koob and Le Moal, 2008b). Many
people try drugs; an estimated 36% of people aged between 16
and 59 have engaged in illicit drug use, the highest incidence of
use being reported in young adults aged under 25 (Department of
Health, 2011). For the majority, drug use is controlled, limited to
a short period of time and does not result in problems. However, a
small proportion develop substance dependence which is defined
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) as excessive drug use that may result in tolerance and
withdrawal symptoms, an inability to cut down on drug use,
and continued drug use in spite of knowledge of negative conse-
quences. The term “addiction” is used by the National Institute
of Drug Abuse (NIDA) to describe a chronic, relapsing disor-
der characterized by compulsive drug use in spite of harmful
consequences, and roughly corresponds to the DSM definition
of dependence. Substance abuse is defined in DSM as recurrent
use of a substance resulting in occupational, legal, social, and
interpersonal problems.
Dependence is a major medical, social, and economic problem
for many countries worldwide. For example, tobacco contributes
to 8.8% of deaths worldwide, alcohol to 3.2%, and illicit drugs to
0.4% (WHO, 2008). In England alone, around 24% of adult men
and 13% of adult women consume hazardous amounts of alco-
hol, costing the economy approximately £20 billion (NHS, 2009).
In 2003/2004 class A drug use cost the UK roughly £15.4 bil-
lion (Singleton et al., 2006), 90% of this cost due to drug-related
crime, with the health care costs amounting to approximately £1.4
billion per year (Lingford-Hughes et al., 2010).While an extensive
range of drugs are abused, opiates, cocaine, and alcohol have been
identified as the three drugs most dangerous to both the individ-
ual and society (Nutt et al., 2010) and they will be the focus of this
review.
Drug dependence is associated with changes to brain struc-
tural, neuropsychological, and emotion systems (Asensio et al.,
2010). These changes have the potential to influence vulnerability
for substance dependence, contribute to themaintenance of prob-
lem drug use once it has started, as well as affecting the likelihood
of relapse following detoxification. Clinically and therapeutically
it is important to understand the mechanisms of each of these
three stages of addiction. Identification of vulnerability markers
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for problem drug use would allow the possibility of early inter-
vention, or even preventative therapies in high-risk individuals.
Understanding the mechanisms of maintenance of drug-taking
behavior is important for preventing initial drug use from devel-
oping into dependence. Perhaps the most difficult problem facing
the treatment of addiction is the very high rate of relapse follow-
ing initially successful treatment (Sinha, 2011), and it is therefore
crucial to understand the factors involved, in order to break the
cycle of repeated detoxification and relapse.
It is clear that substance dependence is a multi-factorial prob-
lem, with a range of social, environmental, cognitive, and neuro-
biological factors contributing to vulnerability, maintenance, and
relapse. The focus of this special issue is the interaction between
cognition and emotion, and we therefore focus on this aspect of
addiction research.
We will argue that substance dependence is a disorder char-
acterized by dysregulation of emotional processes with a par-
ticular focus on reward circuitry, involved in motivation and
reinforcement, and stress circuitry involved in defense. Reward
and stress processing includes the modulation of cognitive per-
formance by the presence (or absence) of motivationally salient
outcomes, while stress responsivity additionally incorporates a
component of achieving, ormaintaining, successful cognitive per-
formance under conditions of emotional stress and anxiety. Both
these aspects of cognitive-emotional interaction are dysfunc-
tional in individuals dependent on drugs, and we will describe
how these dysfunctions may result in maladaptive behaviors that
both initiate and maintain dependence and increase the risk of
relapse during a period of abstinence. Specifically, we will con-
sider how emotional dysregulation may contribute to cognitive
impairments in the domains of impulsivity and decision-making,
aspects of processing which may contribute to the development
and maintenance of drug misuse.
WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?
The term emotion has been applied to a diverse array of percep-
tions, behaviors, and psychological states (Cardinal et al., 2002).
We adopt the definition of emotion recently put forward by
LeDoux—that emotions are phenomena that reflect functions of
circuits allowing an organism to survive and thrive by detecting
and responding to salient challenges and opportunities within the
environment. That is, emotions are brain “responses that occur
when in danger, or when in the presence of a potential mate,
or in the presence of food when hungry or drink when thirsty
. . . ..” (LeDoux, 2012). By “emotional processing” we refer to the
processing of information within these circuits. This operational-
ized definition removes the focus away from emotions reflecting
subjective feeling states (which present problems when assessing
emotions in animals) toward emotions reflecting processes that
are experimentally tractable (LeDoux, 2000).
Emotional circuits detect key trigger stimuli (or uncondi-
tioned stimuli) on the basis of innate, hard-wired program-
ming that has evolved through natural selection (LeDoux, 2012).
These unconditioned stimuli can be potential sources of imme-
diate pleasure, threat, or satisfaction of homeostatic need, such
as immediate stress or withdrawal relief (Verdejo-Garcia and
Bechara, 2009). Activation of emotional circuitry has a number
of consequences within the brain and body. Changes include
increased release of neurotransmitters such as dopamine, nora-
drenaline, and serotonin within the brain, and changes within the
internal milieu and viscera of the body such as release of hor-
mones and increased heart rate (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). In
addition, emotional circuit activation can result in the conscious
feeling states that are commonly associated with the word “emo-
tion.” Emotion circuit activation also results in hard-wired, innate
behavioral responses such as approach, freezing, and fleeing (van
der Meer et al., 2012).
PAVLOVIAN CONDITIONING
When emotional circuits are activated, learning occurs, with
the establishment of an association between innate triggers or
biologically significant events (referred to as unconditioned stim-
uli, UCS) and previously neutral stimuli that occurred in close
association with them (Rescorla, 1988). The previously neu-
tral stimuli acquires motivational value, reflecting the utility or
value of the UCS (Seymour and Dolan, 2008), and acquires
the ability to activate emotional circuitry themselves, thereby
becoming conditioned stimuli (CS) (LeDoux, 2012). This emo-
tional learning process is referred to as Pavlovian conditioning,
after Ivan Pavlov, the discoverer of this phenomenon (Cardinal
et al., 2002). This ability of the CS to predict the value or
utility of the UCS results in an expectancy of the UCS upon
presentation of the CS (Seymour and Dolan, 2008), which
enables appropriate responses to be evoked by the CS in antic-
ipation of the UCS. The amygdala is the brain structure that
is considered to have a central role in Pavlovian condition-
ing, as well as a crucial role in emotional circuitry involved in
processing reward and threat (Cardinal et al., 2002; LeDoux,
2007).
PATHWAYS INTO SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE
EMOTIONAL PERSONALITY TRAITS AND THE RISK FOR SUBSTANCE
USE AND DEPENDENCE
Motivation to engage in substance use, in addition to numerous
psychosocial factors, has been related to the ability of a sub-
stance to produce positive emotional states (Volkow et al., 2011).
This is also referred to as positive reinforcement. A desire for
substance induced pleasure appears to be associated with cer-
tain personality traits. The trait of sensation-seeking is defined by
the need for novel, varied, and intense experiences (Zuckerman,
1994) and, as will be reviewed later, is associated with functioning
within the reward circuitry. Higher levels of sensation-seeking are
found in alcohol-dependent individuals (Noel et al., 2011) and in
young adults with alcohol use disorders (Shin et al., 2012). Higher
levels of sensation-seeking have also been reported in cocaine-
dependent individuals (Patkar et al., 2004; Ersche et al., 2010b)
and shown to be negatively associated with treatment outcomes
(Patkar et al., 2004). Mixed results have been found in opiate-
dependent individuals, with higher levels of sensation-seeking
found in some studies (Le Bon et al., 2004; Lemenager et al., 2011)
but not others (Nielsen et al., 2012). The trait has also been shown
to be associated with early alcohol use in adolescents (Martin
et al., 2002; Gillespie et al., 2012; Nees et al., 2012) and is predic-
tive of the later development of alcohol abuse (Cloninger et al.,
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1988) and the frequency and quantity of alcohol and polysub-
stance use in young adults (Chakroun et al., 2004; Woicik et al.,
2009).
Motivations for drug and alcohol use in sensation seekers are
associated with the enhancement of positive affect states (Comeau
et al., 2001; Woicik et al., 2009). By contrast, another motive
for engaging in substance use is to reduce negative affect states
(Koob and Le Moal, 2008a), also referred to as negative rein-
forcement. Thus, a tendency to experience more negative states
could increase the risk of developing substance dependence. In
line with this hypothesis, high self-report measures of anxiety
sensitivity are related to anxiolytic and opiate drug use in young
adults, problem drinking in adolescents (Woicik et al., 2009),
and early alcohol initiation in adolescents (Kaplow et al., 2001).
Furthermore, the characteristic of “hopelessness,” which closely
relates to depressive personality traits, is associated with a higher
degree of sedative drug use in young adults as well as quantity
and frequency of alcohol use in adolescents (Woicik et al., 2009).
Motivation for substance use in those with anxiety sensitive and
depressive traits is associated with relieving these negative affect
states (Comeau et al., 2001; Woicik et al., 2009). It is important
to note that other studies in young adults have failed to find an
association between increased negative affect states and drug and
alcohol use (Chakroun et al., 2004; Gillespie et al., 2012). These
discrepancies suggest that there is considerable variability, consis-
tent with the hypothesis of multiple routes into drug and alcohol
dependence. It is likely that different personality traits will confer
vulnerability via interactions with different environmental trig-
gers, and therefore studies in different populations may show
discrepant results.
Another important issue is whether emotional personality
traits confer differential risk for specific substance dependences,
and there is some evidence suggesting this to be the case. Studies
suggest that traits of anxiety sensitivity and hopelessness are more
related to anxiolytic and opiate dependence respectively, while
sensation-seeking and impulsivity confer a greater risk of alcohol
and cocaine dependence respectively (Conrod et al., 2000). High
scores on anxiety sensitivity are more associated with primary use
of heroin compared to cocaine, or the use of both heroin and
cocaine (Lejuez et al., 2006) and high scorers on anxiety sensitivity
are less likely to identify cocaine as their drug of choice compared
to those with moderate anxiety sensitivity (Norton et al., 1997).
These preferences may reflect the anxiolytic and the anxiogenic
effects of opiates (Lejuez et al., 2006; Colasanti et al., 2011) and
cocaine (Yang et al., 1992) respectively.
However, once again the evidence is far from conclusive.While
Conrod et al. (2000) observed no association between negative
affect personality traits and alcohol dependence, Norton et al.
demonstrated that high scorers on traits of anxiety sensitivity
indicated alcohol to be their drug of choice (Norton et al., 1997).
Carpenter and Hasin demonstrated that in a sample of heavy
drinkers the tendency to drink in an attempt to cope with neg-
ative affect was a risk factor for the subsequent development of
alcohol dependence (Carpenter and Hasin, 1998). Furthermore,
longitudinal studies have shown that adolescents with symptoms
of depression and anxiety were at a greater risk of develop-
ing alcohol dependence (Mackie et al., 2011; McKenzie et al.,
2011). Such findings may reflect the ability of alcohol to reduce
negative affect (Gilman et al., 2008). Negative affect has also
been associated with cocaine use, with higher levels of associated
with cocaine use in a community-based sample of young adults
(Kilbey et al., 1992) and depression in adolescents predicted
higher cocaine use the following year (Newcomb and Bentler,
1986). These findings are contrary to the hypothesis that negative
affect traits selectively confer enhanced risk of opiate and anxi-
olytic abuse. Studies have shown that major depressive disorder is
prevalent in cocaine-dependents and the presence of depression
may impact upon the severity of addiction (Rounsaville, 2004),
further supporting an association between negative affect traits
and cocaine dependence. However, longitudinal studies assessing
the relationship between these traits and the subsequent devel-
opment of cocaine dependence are required to determine the
degree to which negative affect can be considered a cause, and/or
a consequence of cocaine dependence.
While questions remain about the relationship between traits
and specific addictions, it is clear that in general, affective person-
ality traits can modulate drug use, resulting in early, and more
frequent substance use and substance dependence. Sensation-
seeking appears to be related to enhancing positive affect states
and may be associated with earlier, heavier, and more frequent
substance use in young adults, and particularly with alcohol
and cocaine dependence. By contrast, it appears that personality
traits associated with negative affect are more likely to be asso-
ciated with use of sedatives and opiates. However, this is by no
means a complete dissociation. Some studies have indicated that
sensation-seeking may be elevated in heroin users. Similarly, neg-
ative affect may play a role in cocaine and alcohol dependence,
particularly the transition from heavy use to dependence.
NEUROBIOLOGY UNDERLYING PERSONALITY RISK FACTORS FOR
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE
These personality risk factors for substance dependence are
assumed to exert their influence via altered functioning of brain
motivational systems, leading to differential susceptibility to seek
out specific drug-reinforcement effects (Conrod et al., 2000).
In this section of the review, we will outline the underlying
neurobiology of traits of sensation-seeking, hopelessness, and
anxiety/stress sensitivity and how these neurobiological mark-
ers may lead to the development and maintenance of substance
dependence.
Sensation-seeking and reward neurobiology
Rewards have been defined as hedonic incentives that cause neu-
ral representations that elicit motivation and goal pursuit, and
as stimuli that positively reinforce behavioral acts (Kelley and
Berridge, 2002; Schultz, 2006), thus the term “reinforcer” is often
used interchangeably with “reward.” The processing of rewards is
complex, involving different psychological components including
“liking” or hedonic impact of rewards, “wanting” or motivation
for rewards, and learning, the formation of associations through
experience that allow for predictions of future rewards (Berridge
and Kringelbach, 2008). Stimuli associated with a reward acquire
the ability to elicit innate emotional responses that are normally
associated with the reward itself, via Pavlovian conditioning.
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Sensation-seeking is thought to reflect the function of an
underlying motivational system or behavioral approach sys-
tem (Gray, 1990) that is activated by reward signals, and rep-
resents a heightened sensitivity to these signals (Depue and
Collins, 1999). Specifically, reward signals can elicit a motiva-
tional state referred to as “positive incentive motivation” which
serves to guide approach behavior toward a goal. Positive incen-
tive motivation is associated with strong positive affect such as
desire, excitement, enthusiasm, energy, or self-confidence (Depue
and Collins, 1999). Key brain areas involved with the process-
ing of rewards include ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), ventral pallidum, anterior cingulate cortex, and mid-
brain dopamine neurons (Haber and Knutson, 2010). Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated
a positive correlation between blood oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) response in these key reward processing areas and mea-
sures of reward sensitivity (Beaver et al., 2006; Hahn et al.,
2009) and self-reports of excitement in response to reward
cues (Bjork et al., 2004b, 2008c). A positive correlation has
been reported between ventral striatal activation and trait
measures of sensation-seeking (Bjork et al., 2008a), support-
ing the theory that sensation-seeking reflects enhanced reward
sensitivity.
Dopamine and reward sensitivity. Seminal theories posit that
ventral tegmental dopamine release into the ventral striatum
mediates reward sensitivity by encoding the intensity or “salience”
of reward related stimuli (Robinson and Berridge, 1993), or the
predictive value of conditioned reward stimuli and the error in
the prediction of unconditioned stimuli whenever they are sur-
prising (Schultz, 1998). Therefore, dopamine may influence the
motivational value of stimuli and their impact on emotional and
behavioral responses (Depue and Collins, 1999).
In support of this theory, ventral striatal response to reward
cues, measured by fMRI, has been shown to correlate with ventral
striatal dopamine release, measured by positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) (Schott et al., 2008). Dopamine-enhanced incentive
salience of stimuli has been suggested to increase incentive moti-
vational states and make stimuli, or their associated reward,
more attractive or “wanted.” Dopamine-mediated enhancement
of “wanting” has been suggested to underlie the craving that is
often experienced by drug users after exposure to drug related
stimuli (Robinson and Berridge, 1993).
Dopamine and sensation-seeking. Sensation-seeking is assumed
to reflect heightened reward sensitivity, which is hypothesized to
be modulated by dopamine. This may suggest that sensation-
seeking could also be influenced by dopamine. Genetic linkage
studies demonstrate associations between sensation-seeking and
polymorphisms of dopamine-related genes (Zuckerman, 2005;
Golimbet et al., 2007; Munafo et al., 2008) and a recent PET study
reported an inverted “U” shaped relationship between striatal
dopamine D2/D3 receptor availability and scores of sensation-
seeking (Gjedde et al., 2010). Such a relationship indicates that
dopamine receptor availability rises with sensation-seeking at
lower scores, but falls in opposition to sensation-seeking scores
at the higher end. The authors propose that high levels of
sensation-seeking reflects a hyperdopaminergic state, that results
in reduced D2/D3 availability for the competing PET radioli-
gand, as opposed to a reduced D2/D3 receptor density in these
individuals (Gjedde et al., 2010). This is supported by stud-
ies indicating higher sensation-seeking to be associated with
reduced activity of monoamine oxidase, resulting in higher brain
dopamine concentrations (Zuckerman, 1985; Golimbet et al.,
2007). Furthermore the closely related trait of novelty-seeking is
found to be inversely correlated with midbrain D2/D3 autore-
ceptor availability, with higher novelty-seeking related to lower
autoreceptor availability (Zald et al., 2008). In contrast, to post-
synaptic dopamine receptors, midbrain dopamine receptor avail-
ability remains relatively constant after pharmacological manip-
ulations that alter dopamine levels. Therefore, receptor availabil-
ities of midbrain autoreceptors found in this study are assumed
to reflect receptor densities, rather than levels of competing
endogenous dopamine (Zald et al., 2008). The DA autoreceptor
exerts a powerful inhibitory effect on dopamine neuron firing
(Aghajanian and Bunney, 1977), thus lower autoreceptor densi-
ties found in high novelty seekers might be expected to result in
higher levels of dopamine release. This hypothesis is supported
by studies demonstrating that novelty-seeking positively corre-
lates with drug-induced dopamine release (Leyton et al., 2002;
Boileau et al., 2006). In addition to the role of dopamine in
sensation/novelty-seeking, other neurotransmitter systems may
also be involved as interactive effects between dopamine- and
serotonin-related genes and novelty-seeking have been reported
(Zuckerman, 2005).
Negative affect traits and reward neurobiology
Depressive personality traits. Two core features of depression
are a markedly reduced interest or pleasure in activities and
low mood (feelings of sadness), thus depressive personality traits
are also linked to dysfunction of brain reward and motivational
systems, and may specifically relate to hypofunctioning of the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system (Pizzagalli et al., 2009). Most
neurobiological theories of depression focus on the serotoner-
gic and noradrenergic systems, since all effective anti-depressant
medications converge upon these systems. However, preclini-
cal evidence suggests some of the therapeutic effects of anti-
depressants may be partly due to increased striatal dopamine
transmission and enhanced sensitivity within the mesolimbic
dopamine system (Markou et al., 1998). Furthermore, recent
studies demonstrate that manipulations of proteins regulating
ventral tegmental dopamine produce behavioral phenotypes rel-
evant to depression (Nestler and Carlezon, 2006).
Anxiety sensitive personality traits. Anxiety sensitivity is
thought to reflect functions of a defence system that is activated
by aversive, novel, and innate fear stimuli (Barros-Loscertales
et al., 2006). Anxiety is a motivational state that promotes
adaptive behaviors; it is, however, distressing for the organ-
ism and impairs performance when excessive (Colasanti et al.,
2011). The anxiety/stress system is modulated by numerous
neurotransmitters including corticotrophin releasing factor, neu-
ropeptide Y, substance P, noradrenaline, serotonin, dopamine,
glutamate, and GABA—see Charney and Drevets (2002) for
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detailed review. In contrast to sensation-seeking and depres-
sive personality traits, anxiety sensitivity may not directly reflect
abnormalities within the brain’s reward system but instead may
reflect indirect effects. For example, it has been suggested that
concomitant inputs from key anxiety structures affect the way
neural signals are “gated” within the nucleus accumbens such
that they not rewarding but instead serve to increase motiva-
tion to deal with the threat at hand (Nestler and Carlezon,
2006).
REWARD SENSITIVITY THEORIES OF SUBSTANCE
DEPENDENCE
These findings raise the crucial question of how sensation-
seeking, depressive, and anxiety sensitive personality traits confer
increased risk of developing addiction. There is evidence that
sensation-seeking and depressive traits reflect dopaminergic dis-
turbances which influence response to reward and control of
incentive motivation. We have presented evidence that these pre-
morbid traits result in early, more frequent use of substances.
In the following sections we will also present evidence of addi-
tional drug-induced adaptations within the reward circuitry that
are proposed to enhance the desire to engage in substance
use, contributing to the subsequent development of substance
dependence.
Dysfunction within brain reward systems, where dopamine
signaling has important functions, has been widely studied in
addiction. Alterations in reward responsiveness and incentive
motivation represent an important way in which emotional pro-
cessing can impact cognitive function, resulting in poorly con-
trolled, and maladaptive behavior. In this section, we will briefly
outline two major theories of impaired reward sensitivity in
addiction.
INCENTIVE SENSITIZATION IN SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE
Sensation-seeking is assumed to reflect heightened reward sen-
sitivity and heightened positive incentive motivation. Sensation
seekers may have enhanced motivation to engage in initial sub-
stance to further increase positive affect states. The transition
from controlled recreational drug use to compulsive use is
hypothesized to be the result of drug-induced sensitization of
mesocorticolimbic brain systems that attribute incentive salience
to reward-associated cues. The main points of this theory are that
previously neutral stimuli acquire incentive motivational prop-
erties through association with drug rewards via Pavlovian con-
ditioning mechanisms. Therefore, exposure to conditioned drug
cues can produce dopamine release from mesolimbic dopamine
neurons that causes drug wanting. Repeated exposure to addic-
tive substances may result in neuroadaptation in mesolimbic
dopamine neurons that sensitize these neurons (Robinson and
Berridge, 1993). This effect has been demonstrated in animal
models as an enhanced expression of psychomotor activating
effects of all drugs of abuse, which is thought to be depen-
dent upon the mesolimbic dopaminergic system (Robinson and
Berridge, 2001). In humans, enhanced release of dopamine after
a repeated dose of amphetamine has been observed (Boileau et al.,
2006) and enhanced presynaptic dopamine function has recently
been reported in ex-recreational users of psychostimulant drugs,
although it is unknown whether this reflects a pre-existing
hyperactivity or a drug induced effect (Tai et al., 2011). This
sensitization of mesolimbic neurons is suggested to result in
pathological levels of incentive salience being attributed to drugs
and drug cues, thus creating a pathological incentive motivation
for drugs which can persist for years (Robinson and Berridge,
2008).
REWARD DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
Dopamine is related to incentive motivational aspects of rewards
which are in turn associated with strong positive affect such as
excitement, enthusiasm, and self-confidence (Depue and Collins,
1999). Many drugs of abuse, either directly or indirectly, induce
acute release of dopamine from mesolimbic dopamine neurons
into the nucleus accumbens in rodents (Di Chiara et al., 2004),
while stimulants but not heroin, have been demonstrated to
increase dopamine release into the ventral striatum in humans
(Lingford-Hughes et al., 2010) with mixed findings with respect
to alcohol and dopamine release in humans (Boileau et al.,
2003; Yoder et al., 2009). Pleasurable feelings of intoxication
correlate with ventral striatal dopamine release for stimulants
(Volkow et al., 1999) and alcohol (Boileau et al., 2003) and thus
dopamine may be important for the rewarding effects of drugs of
abuse (Volkow et al., 2011). However, the idea that drug-induced
dopamine release mediates the hedonic impact of drugs of abuse
is controversial (Wachtel et al., 2002; Berridge, 2007). Instead
these rewarding effects may occur via the enhancement of the
perceptual impact or incentive salience of environmental stimuli
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005).
The opioid system is related to consummatory aspects of
reward such as satiation, sedation, and “bliss” (Comings and
Blum, 2000). Generally speaking the pleasurable feelings associ-
ated with opiate drugs are due to mu and delta opioid receptor
agonism (LeMerrer et al., 2009). Heroin exerts its euphoric effects
through mu opioid receptor agonism, as blockade of these recep-
tors has been demonstrated to reduce opiate self-administration
(De Vries and Shippenberg, 2002). However, emerging evidence
suggests the opioid system is not only involved in the reinforcing
effects of heroin, but also those of alcohol (Mitchell et al., 2012)
and amphetamine (Jayaram-Lindstrom et al., 2008; Colasanti
et al., 2012) via the release of endogenous opioids. Furthermore,
increased mu opioid receptor binding has been found in cocaine
users, suggesting an important role of the endogenous opioid
system in cocaine dependence (Ghitza et al., 2010).
Comings and Blum put forward the “Reward Deficiency
Hypothesis” (RDS) as one possible vulnerability for the develop-
ment of substance dependence. This theory highlights the role of
pre-morbid trait vulnerabilities in the subsequent development
of substance dependence. According to this hypothesis, individu-
als with deficient reward-signaling systems may be at greater risk
of developing substance dependence. In such individuals, natu-
ral rewards do not adequately stimulate the reward system, which
may contribute to depressive traits associated with substance use.
Therefore, it is proposed that such individuals use substances in
order to enhance stimulation in deficient reward pathways.
After the development of substance dependence, the influ-
ence of negative affect becomes more apparent, suggesting that
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chronic drug use may lead to changes to the brain’s reward sys-
tem. Therefore, in addition to trait vulnerabilities in the reward
system, drug-induced neurobiological changes may result in addi-
tional deficiencies in reward sensitivity. Koob and colleagues have
argued that these homeostatic or “opponent” processes occur to
reduce the rewarding effects of drugs of abuse (Koob and Le
Moal, 2005). In support of this theory, increased tolerance to the
rewarding effects of cocaine (Kenny et al., 2003), opiates (Liu and
Schulteis, 2004), and alcohol (Schulteis and Liu, 2006) occurs in
rodents as demonstrated in intracranial self-stimulation experi-
ments. Acute withdrawal is associated with reduced mesolimbic
dopamine release (Koob and Le Moal, 2005). Therefore, these
changes are likely to underlie anhedonia and amotivation asso-
ciated with withdrawal from drugs of abuse.
HUMAN STUDIES ASSESSING REWARD FUNCTIONING IN ADDICTION
There are thus two distinct theories about how reward sensitiv-
ity may be abnormal in addiction. One theory is that substance
dependence is characterized by enhanced sensitivity to reward
and therefore enhanced incentive motivation toward drug and
even non-drug cues (Hommer et al., 2011). However, drug use
is also associated with negative affect states and the reward defi-
ciency syndrome posits that reduced functioning of the brain’s
reward system underlies the motivation to engage in substance
use in order to normalize these deficiencies. These theories make
different predictions about how the brain reward systems will
respond to a range of reward cues. Functional imaging tech-
niques provide a means to investigate these predictions in human
subjects.
Brain response to monetary cues
Studies have examined brain response to monetary reward using
the monetary incentive delay task (Knutson et al., 2001). In
alcohol-dependent individuals, there have been mixed findings.
Two studies have found ventral striatal activation to be decreased
in dependent individuals to controls, and negatively correlated
with craving levels (Wrase et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009). These
findings therefore support the reward deficiency theory of addic-
tion. However, another study found no difference between con-
trols and alcohol-dependent individuals in response to monetary
cues (Bjork et al., 2008c), but enhanced ventral striatal activation
in response to reward outcome, a findingmore consistent with the
hypersensitivity hypothesis of addiction. The authors suggested
that decreased ventral striatal activations formonetary cues found
by Beck et al. and Wrase et al. may have been due to faster trial
presentation putting too high a demand on attentional process-
ing, rather than reduced reward sensitivity. However, a later study
by the same group failed to replicate the finding of enhanced ven-
tral striatal activation to reward outcome (Bjork et al., 2011). One
possible source of the discrepant findings may be that the stud-
ies of Bjork and colleagues, in contrast to the studies of Beck
et al. and Wrase et al., included alcohol-dependent participants
reporting current or past substance dependence, most signifi-
cantly, cocaine. Therefore, the evidence suggests that dependence
upon alcohol only is associated with a reward system insensitivity.
However, it is also important to note that studies in individuals
already dependent on alcohol do not provide clear evidence for
how that dependence developed initially. The lack of conclusive
findings may reflect heterogeneity within the alcohol-dependent
groups, consistent with the results of personality studies reviewed
earlier. Both sensation-seeking (Conrod et al., 2000) and negative
affect (Carpenter and Hasin, 1998) traits have been found to be
associated with alcohol dependence. It is possible the discrepant
reward sensitivity theories illustrate distinct routes into alcohol
dependence for individuals with different personality traits.
Only one study to date has carried out the monetary incentive
delay task in cocaine-dependent individuals, reporting no differ-
ences in ventral striatal responses between controls and cocaine-
dependent individuals during reward anticipation, but enhanced
ventral striatal response in cocaine-dependents for reward out-
comes (Jia et al., 2011). BOLD responses during reward antici-
pation and outcome were found to be negatively correlated with
abstinence measures and treatment retention. This finding, in
addition to the enhanced vs. response in alcohol-dependent par-
ticipants reporting significant cocaine dependence, suggests an
enhanced reward sensitivity occurs in cocaine addiction.
Two other studies investigated brain response to monetary
rewards in cocaine users with a related task, reporting no
differences in ventral striatal BOLD response but disturbed
OFC responsivity to different monetary value conditions within
cocaine-dependent individuals (Goldstein et al., 2007a,b). Whilst
OFCmetabolism has been shown to depend on striatal dopamine
receptor density (Volkow et al., 1993), it is difficult to draw
conclusions regarding the direction of the sensitivity of mesocor-
ticolimbic system based on these findings.
At the time of writing, we are not aware of any published brain
imaging studies investigating response to monetary reward in opi-
ate addiction. However, given that opiate addiction appears to be
more related to depressive personality traits that are characterized
by anhedonia and reduced motivation, that are considered to be
related to deficient reward system functioning, it could be pre-
dicted that a reduced ventral striatal activation would be found to
monetary cues and reward outcome in opiate addiction.
Brain response to drug cues
Assessing the brain response to conditioned drug-related stimuli
or drug “cues” has been central to addiction research. Neural and
psychological responses to drug cues are considered to be impor-
tant in the maintenance of addiction and have been implicated
in triggering relapse to drug use during periods of abstinence
(Everitt et al., 2001).
Due to the huge number of studies assessing the brain response
to drug stimuli, a comprehensive review of cue induced crav-
ing studies is beyond the scope of the current review. However,
two recent activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses
of these studies have been conducted (Chase et al., 2011; Kuhn
and Gallinat, 2011). Kuhn and Gallinat reported that enhanced
brain response to drug cues compared to non-drug cues in alco-
hol and cocaine addiction converge upon the ventral striatum.
Additionally, Chase et al. found areas of convergence in the ven-
tral striatum, OFC, and amygdala in response to alcohol, heroin,
and cocaine cues compared to control cues. Furthermore, ALE
meta-analyses were carried out on all of the studies reporting
correlations between brain response and self-reported craving.
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Kuhn and Gallinat found that activity within anterior cingulate
cortex, ventral striatum, and pallidum correlated with craving in
alcohol studies, whereas the study of Chase et al. which included
a wider range of studies, found amygdala correlations.
In summary, these results suggest that drug cues, compared to
non-drug cues, result in increased brain activation in key reward
processing areas, and greater activation in these regions is asso-
ciated with subjective craving. Reward system activation to drug
cues that results in increased drug wanting supports the incentive
sensitization view of addiction. However, such findings seemingly
contradict reports of reduced reward system activation to mon-
etary cues in alcohol-dependent individuals, a finding more in
keeping with the reward deficiency theory. It is possible that the
reward system may be overactive specifically in response to drug
cues, but not other reward cues (where it may be underactive), in
line with theories suggesting a biasing of reward systems toward
drug-related stimuli. To explore this idea further, we will review
studies of responses to natural reward cues in drug dependence.
Drug cues vs. natural rewards
An alternative method of probing reward functioning is to exam-
ine brain response to natural reward stimuli, that is cues that
have survival significance, such as cues for food, water, and sex.
Garavan et al. compared the brain response to drug films and
erotic films in cocaine users and healthy volunteers. Both films
activated a similar network including medial and dorsal pre-
frontal, parietal, cingulate and insular cortices, and subcortical
regions including caudate and thalamus in drug users. Between
group comparisons revealed enhanced responses in anterior cin-
gulate, inferior parietal lobe, and caudate in drug users compared
with healthy controls for the drug video, but reduced responses
to the erotic video (Garavan et al., 2000). Another study inves-
tigating responses to erotic images found that cocaine users
had reduced ventral and dorsal striatal and medial prefrontal
responses compared to healthy controls (Asensio et al., 2010).
The authors suggest this hypoactivation indicates deficient reward
evaluation, motivational, and saliency attribution for natural
reward stimuli.
In contrast to these studies, where natural reward stimuli and
drug stimuli activated a similar network of brain regions, a study
examining responses to heroin and water cues in thirsty heroin
users found differential activation for different cues (Xiao et al.,
2006). Water cues activated anterior cingulate cortex, whereas
heroin cues activated bilateral inferior frontal cortex, cerebel-
lum, and visual processing areas. Whilst the authors suggest that
heroin and natural rewards activate different reward-related brain
areas, this is not supported by earlier studies reporting anterior
cingulate activation to heroin cues (Daglish et al., 2001).
Brain responses to cues for drugs and natural rewards have
been measured using electroencephalography (EEG). The P300
waveform is of particular interest for the processing of stimuli,
appearing 300ms after presentation. Stimuli classified as salient
attract greater attentional processing and produce larger P300s
(Lubman et al., 2007).
A recent study compared subjective and electrophysiological
response to images of natural reward (food, erotic) and heroin
stimuli in healthy controls and heroin users. Heroin users rated
natural reward stimuli as less arousing than healthy controls, and
less arousing than drug stimuli. A direct comparison between
P300 amplitudes for drug and natural reward stimuli indicated
that amplitudes were increased for drug stimuli and reduced for
natural reward stimuli in drug users (with the opposite found in
controls), indicating drug cues attracted more attentional pro-
cessing. Furthermore, heroin users displayed less startle-elicited
P300 attenuation whilst viewing images of natural rewards rela-
tive to neutral images, compared to controls, suggesting they did
not attend strongly to images of natural reward. Subjective ratings
of pleasantness for the natural rewards robustly predicted later
heroin use with lower pleasantness ratings associated with greater
heroin use (Lubman et al., 2009). These findings of enhanced
responses to drugs cues but reduced responses to natural rewards
provide support for both the incentive sensitization theory of
addiction and the reward deficiency hypothesis respectively, com-
patible with a biasing of reward systems toward drug cues and
away from non-drug cues.
Positron emission tomography studies indexing reward sensitivity
PET has also been used to index reward sensitivity of drug
users, enabling quantification of brainDA receptors bymeasuring
radioligand binding, and indirect measures of DA neurotrans-
mission from changes in radioligand binding. Studies examining
endogenous dopamine release in response to pharmacological
challenge have found that striatal dopamine release is signifi-
cantly blunted in cocaine- (Volkow et al., 1997; Martinez et al.,
2007), alcohol- (Martinez et al., 2005), and heroin (Martinez
et al., 2012) -dependent subjects. Furthermore, the greater the
reduction in dopamine release in cocaine-dependent subjects, the
more cocaine was used in the treatment setting (Martinez et al.,
2007), although this relationship was not found in heroin users.
Radioligand D2/D3 receptor levels have consistently been found
to be reduced in the striatum of cocaine- (Volkow et al., 1993;
Martinez et al., 2004), alcohol- (Volkow et al., 1996; Heinz et al.,
2004), and heroin (Zijlstra et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2012)-
dependent individuals, leading to the conclusion that chronic
drug use is associated with reduced concentration of D2 recep-
tors. Moreover, the reduced ventral striatal D2/D3 binding in
alcohol-dependent subjects was associated with enhanced alcohol
craving and enhanced prefrontal brain activation to alcohol cues,
as measured with fMRI (Heinz et al., 2004).
A potential confound of these studies may be that, due to the
sensitization of dopamine neurons, dopamine levels were higher
at baseline in the dependent groups, resulting in reduced avail-
ability of unbound D2/D3 receptor for the competing radioligand
to bind to, rather than D2/D3 density being low per se. However,
a PET study determining baseline dopamine levels in cocaine
dependence demonstrated lower levels in cocaine-dependents,
indicating dopaminergic neurotransmission andD2/D3 receptors
are indeed reduced in these individuals (Martinez et al., 2009).
A blunted dopamine system supports the reward deficiency
hypothesis of drug dependence. However, in line with the incen-
tive sensitization view of addiction, studies have demonstrated
enhanced striatal dopamine release in response to drug cues in
cocaine (Volkow et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2006) and heroin
(Zijlstra et al., 2008) dependence. This dopamine release to
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conditioned drug cues was located to the dorsal, but not the
ventral, striatum that has been implicated in habitual, stimulus-
response type action selection (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Redish
et al., 2008). Cue-induced dorsal striatum dopamine release was
positively correlated with acute craving levels and addiction sever-
ity in the cocaine studies and chronic craving level in the heroin
study. Thus, it appears that baseline levels are low, however, in the
presence of drug cues, high levels of dopamine are released that
result in drug craving. This is consistent with the idea that there is
an overall reward deficiency, but brain reward systems are biased
to be sensitized specifically to drug cues.
Summary of reward system changes—the emergence of attentional
bias for drug stimuli
From this brief review, it is clear that there is evidence for
both the incentive sensitization and reward deficiency theories of
addiction (see Figure 1). The incentive sensitization theory posits
that stimuli associated with drugs obtain incentive motivational
properties via Pavlovian conditioning mechanisms. Repeated
exposure to addictive substances results in the sensitization of
mesolimbic brain circuitry that results in excessive dopamine
release in response to drug cues. This is proposed to produce
a heightened incentive motivation to take drugs that underlies
compulsive drug-seeking in addiction (Robinson and Berridge,
1993). This theory is supported by enhanced striatal and pre-
frontal BOLD response to drug cues across all dependencies, and
enhanced cue-induced striatal dopamine release in cocaine and
heroin dependence, that was associated with drug craving, and
greater attentional processing of drug cues in opiate dependence.
Furthermore, enhanced brain activation to monetary reward has
been found in cocaine-dependents and comorbid alcohol- and
cocaine-dependent individuals (Bjork et al., 2008c; Jia et al.,
2011).
The reward deficiency hypothesis argues that reduced func-
tioning of brain reward systems underlies addiction, such that
individuals seek pharmacological enhancement of their defi-
cient reward systems because natural rewards do not adequately
stimulate them. Evidence comes in the form of decreased brain
response for natural reward stimuli in fMRI studies in cocaine-
dependent individuals (Garavan et al., 2000; Asensio et al., 2010),
decreased BOLD response to monetary reward in alcohol depen-
dence, decreased attentional processing of naturally rewarding
stimuli in opiate users as demonstrated in EEG studies (Lubman
et al., 2009), and increased reward thresholds across all dependen-
cies as demonstrated in animal studies (Koob, 2009). PET studies
have also demonstrated reduced striatal D2/D3 receptor density
in alcohol-dependent subjects that is associated with enhanced
craving (Heinz et al., 2004), and reduced endogenous dopamine
release in cocaine users that was associated with greater cocaine
use (Martinez et al., 2007).
There are numerous possible explanations for the reported
findings. Different findings in response to monetary cues in alco-
hol and cocaine dependence suggest that different substances
of abuse are associated with different reward system abnor-
malities. Such differences may reflect differences in pre-existing
trait vulnerabilities for substance dependence that are hypothe-
sized to reflect hyper and hypo activity of reward systems such
as sensation-seeking and negative affect traits respectively (that
result in different motives for the engagement of substance use),
or distinct pharmacological effects of the different drugs them-
selves on brain reward systems. However, although behavioral
sensitization is most commonly demonstrated with psychostim-
ulant drugs, it has also been demonstrated with most drugs of
abuse in animals (Narendran and Martinez, 2008). Furthermore,
reward sensitivity may change over the course of one’s drug using
career, initially reflecting pre-existing traits that predispose indi-
viduals to engage in substance use, but then being modulated by
sensitization of dopamine neurons after drug use that increases
the motivational salience of drug rewards. Continual drug expo-
sure may however, result in the dominance of opponent processes
that counteract sensitization and the chronic presence of drugs of
abuse. This may ultimately result in an allostatic shift to deficient
reward functioning, producing a dependence upon substances
of abuse in order to restore reward deficits. This is suggested
FIGURE 1 | Reward system changes associated with substance
dependence. Enhanced brain response and craving elicited by drug
cues supports the incentive sensitization view of addiction. This
theory suggests that repeated exposure to drugs of abuse causes
neuroadaptations within mesolimbic dopamine neurons that results in
pathological levels of incentive salience being attributed to drugs and
their associated stimuli. In contrast, reduced brain responses for natural
rewards, and blunted dopaminergic functioning in the absence of drug
cues, are suggestive of deficient reward functioning. This deficient
reward signaling is hypothesized to result in the seeking of drug
rewards as natural rewards do not adequately stimulate the deficient
reward system.
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by the finding that recreational psychostimulant use is associ-
ated with hyperactive dopaminergic activity (Tai et al., 2011),
perhaps reflecting sensation-seeking traits and/or drug induced
sensitization but chronic psychostimulant use is associated with
blunted dopaminergic activity, the severity of which is associated
with greater drug use (Martinez et al., 2009). Although enhanced
brain and attentional responses to drug cues are detected in
chronic drug users, the reward deficiency hypothesis posits that
drug related cues are “framed” as especially salient in compar-
ison to non-drug rewards, due to their greater ability stimulate
deficient reward systems, resulting in bias toward drug-related
stimuli (Hommer et al., 2011). Therefore, perhaps it is the contrast
between dopaminergic response to drug cues compared to natu-
ral rewards and deficient baseline activity, that is the important
factor in driving drug-seeking in chronic drug users, rather than
overall higher activity levels of dopamine neurons (neuroimag-
ing studies do not measure absolute levels of dopamine release or
brain activity in response to drug cues, but instead use indirect
measures that involve comparisons with an unknown baseline).
The ability of drugs of abuse to potently activate brain reward sys-
tems is one reason why drugs of abuse are overvalued within the
brain (Redish et al., 2008). In contrast, the relative impotence of
natural rewards in activating deficit reward systems may result in
natural rewards being undervalued in the brain of a chronic drug
user. The amygdala is crucial for emotional associative learning
and generating responses to CS, specifically allowing a condi-
tioned stimulus to access the value of the reward that it predicts.
This information can be used to modulate motivation via inputs
to midbrain dopamine neurons, and instrumental actions via
projections to ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex (Cardinal
et al., 2002). Therefore, the amygdala may be an important neu-
ral structure involved in the “framing” of salience of drug cues
over natural rewards by translating differences in stored value rep-
resentations between drugs and natural rewards into differential
activity of brain motivational systems.
An alternative explanation for the findings that support both
the incentive sensitization and the reward deficiency hypothesis
may be that both hyperfunctioning and hypofunctioning brain
reward systems occur simultaneously in addiction depending
upon the presence or absence of conditioned cues or contexts.
Neural sensitization of dopamine neurons may be influenced by
associative learning mechanisms such that enhanced neural sen-
sitization occurs for drug cues and contexts but not for non-drug
contexts (Leyton, 2007; Robinson and Berridge, 2008). In ani-
mals, sensitized increases in dopamine release to cocaine occurred
only when animals were tested in an environment where they had
previously experienced drug, and not in an unfamiliar environ-
ment (Duvauchelle et al., 2000). This may explain why increases
in dopamine were detected in dependent subjects in response
to drug cues, but not in response to pharmacological challenge
in a novel environment in the absence of cues. Homeostatic
“opponent” processes (Koob and Le Moal, 2005) may be initiated
simultaneously in response to chronic elevations in dopamine
and opioid levels, such that in the absence of drug cues, the reward
system is hypoactive. Given the important role of the amygdala in
associative learning and the generation of responses to CS, it is
likely to be key structure involved in modulating the expression
of incentive sensitization by allowing the high values of drugs of
abuse to influence mesolimic dopamine systems after exposure to
drug cues and contexts (Volkow et al., 2010).
Although the relationship between reward sensitivity and
addiction is complex, it is clear that reward sensitivity is compro-
mised, with a clear bias toward drug rewards once addiction is
established. Enhanced motivational salience of drugs and related
cues in addicted individuals leads to a biasing of attentional
and cognitive processing toward drug-related cues (Goldstein
and Volkow, 2002). This attentional bias, the automatic selec-
tive attentional response to emotionally salient stimuli, has been
demonstrated in drug word Stroop (Figure 2) and dot probe
detection tasks across heroin (Franken et al., 2000; Lubman et al.,
2000; Marissen et al., 2006), alcohol and cocaine (Lusher et al.,
2004; Hester et al., 2006; Ersche et al., 2010a) dependencies.
Enhanced motivational salience of reward cues is attributed to
increased dopamine release in the ventral striatum (Berridge,
2007) and enhanced attentional processing of drug cues may be
mediated by this dopaminergic activity (Franken, 2003). In addi-
tion to this specific action, “general arousal” effects produced
by emotional circuit activation may contribute to the biasing of
attention toward emotional stimuli (LeDoux, 2012). Generally
increased arousal, produced by the release of noradrenaline,
FIGURE 2 | Example of a drug word emotional Stroop task showing
drug words (A) and neutral words (B). Participants are required to
identify the color of the text as quickly as possible. Successful performance
of this task requires the suppression of emotional responses to word
meaning, and a direction of attention toward non-emotional content
(word color). Slower reaction times are assumed to indicate a greater degree
of emotional interference on cognitive processing. Panel
heroin dependent individuals have significantly slower reaction times for drug
words compared to neutral words (Murphy et al., 2011), reflecting the
emotional significance of the drug words compared to neutral words.
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serotonin, and acetylcholine as well as dopamine, facilitates pro-
cessing in the emotion circuit that triggered the arousal response
initially, and in sensory, cognitive, and memory systems. The
overall effect is that brain systems are coordinated and monop-
olized for the purpose of enhancing the ability of an organism to
benefit from an opportunity or cope with a challenge (LeDoux,
2012). Whilst this action of emotional circuit activation nor-
mally serves to benefit an organism, this emotional influence
over cognitive systems in substance dependence leads to mal-
adaptive behavior. Unlike natural rewards such as food and sex,
drugs of abuse do not have survival significance, but instead they
simulate the action of natural rewards on the brain (Kelley and
Berridge, 2002; Redish et al., 2008). Biasing attention toward
stimuli of substances that are not beneficial for survival (and
which actually may be detrimental) often at the expense of nat-
ural reward stimuli, is a clear example of the negative impact of
emotional influence over cognitive systems. The degree of drug
attentional bias has been shown to be related to craving levels
(Franken et al., 2000; Field et al., 2009), such that greater bias is
associated with enhanced drug craving. Furthermore, enhanced
attentional bias after drug treatment predicts relapse to drug use
in heroin (Marissen et al., 2006) and alcohol-dependent individ-
uals (Garland et al., 2012). Thus, emotional biasing of cognitive
processing appears to have a profound negative effect on clinical
outcome.
ANXIETY AND STRESS SENSITIVITY IN SUBSTANCE
DEPENDENCE
Whilst reward sensitivity is a long-established focus of substance
dependence research, the contribution of changes within the
brain’s stress system is more recently being recognized as an
important mechanism for the maintenance of addiction and also
relapse to drug use during abstinence (Zhang et al., 2011).
Anxiety has been associated with substance use as a form
of self-medication (Woicik et al., 2009) as alcohol and opiates
have anxiolytic properties (Lejuez et al., 2006; Gilman et al.,
2008; Colasanti et al., 2011). Anxiety is thought to reflect func-
tions of a defence system that is activated by aversive, novel, and
innate fear stimuli (Barros-Loscertales et al., 2006). In addition
to threat stimuli, anxiety may also be produced by cognitive pro-
cesses involved in the anticipation, interpretation, or recollection
of perceived stressors or threats (Charney and Drevets, 2002).
The amygdala is critical in generating a response to such threat
stimuli (LeDoux, 2007). Structures involved in anxiety that work
in concert with the amygdala include other medial temporal
structures, sensory cortices and thalamus, insula, hypothalamus,
brain stem, and medial prefrontal cortex. The bed nucleus of
the stria terminalis (BNST) mediates anxiety during exposure to
less well-defined threatening environments or contexts that occur
over several minutes (Charney and Drevets, 2002).
THE “ANTI-REWARD” SYSTEM AND SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE
As reviewed above, chronic drug use results in changes in reward
systems leading to anhedonic states in some substance dependent
individuals. Koob and colleagues additionally propose changes
in “arousal-stress” systems during chronic drug administration,
which are recruited in an attempt to overcome the presence of the
drug and restore normal functioning (Koob, 2009). These sys-
tems include the hypothalamic pituitary axis (HPA) and extended
amygdala (comprising the central nucleus, BNST, and a sub region
of the nucleus accumbens). The extended amygdala receives affer-
ent inputs from the basolateral amygdala and hippocampus and
sends efferents to ventral pallidum and hypothalamus. Thus, it is
ideally placed for its hypothesized role in opposing the reward-
ing effects of drugs of abuse, and has been referred to as the
“anti-reward” system. Chronic drug administration involves the
dysregulation of stress/anti-reward systems and neurochemical
changes in the extended amygdala associated with arousal/stress
modulation (Figure 3) that are associated with the emergence of
negative emotional states such as anxiety and mood disturbances.
Preclinical studies have demonstrated that chronic administration
of all major drugs of abuse is associated with a release of cor-
ticotropic releasing factor (CRF) within the extended amygdala
upon withdrawal and after stress induction with a footshock, that
produces anxiety-like effects and drug-seeking that are reversed
by CRF antagonists (Koob, 2008). These changes persist into
protracted abstinence and are thought to contribute to relapse
to drug-seeking in order to reduce negative emotional states
(Kreek and Koob, 1998). Noradrenergic transmission within the
extended amygdala has been associated enhanced anxiety and
increased drug-seeking and relapse during abstinence in alco-
hol, cocaine, and opiate dependence (Koob, 2008; Smith and
Aston-Jones, 2008). Furthermore, administration of lofexidine, a
drug that reduces noradrenaline release, reduces stress and crav-
ing and improves abstinence in opiate users (Sinha et al., 2007).
Seemingly contradictory to theories ofheightened stress sensitivity
in substance dependence, studies have demonstrated an apparent
insensitivity to aversive stimuli in rats after extended cocaine self-
administration (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Vanderschuren
and Everitt, 2004). In these studies, the presentation of a CS
that predicted an aversive event did not prevent responding for
cocaine. However, the inability of the aversive CS to modulate
FIGURE 3 | Neurotransmitter changes within the brain stress system
that are associated with withdrawal and stress-induced reinstatement
of drug-seeking. Neurochemical changes are proposed to occur within the
extended amygdala in order to overcome the chronic presence of drugs of
abuse. Withdrawal from all major drugs of abuse is associated with CRF
and NA release within the CeA that produces anxiety like responses that
are thought to drive drug seeking via negative reinforcement mechanisms.
CRF and noradrenaline release within the BNST is considered to be
important for mediating drug seeking in response to a stressor, such as a
footshock (Koob, 2008). Abbreviations: CRF, Corticotrophic releasing factor;
NA, Noradrenaline; CeA, central nucleus of the amygdala; BNST, bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis.
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behavior was attributed to the behavior in question being con-
trolled by habit action selection systems (see later section entitled
“Systems Involved in Action Selection”) that by their very nature,
are immune to immediate changes to action outcomes.
HUMAN STUDIES OF ANXIETY IN DRUG DEPENDENCE
This hypersensitivity of the brain’s anxiety/stress system is evi-
dent in clinical populations as opiate-dependents find unpleasant
stimuli more arousing that controls (Aguilar de Arcos et al., 2005,
2008). Enhanced stress reactivity is also apparent in physiological
measures of stress, such as systolic blood pressure (Sinha et al.,
2008), cortisol response (Fatseas et al., 2011), and HPA response
(Fox et al., 2005). For example, alcohol-dependent participants
showed increased heart rate and cortisol levels compared to social
drinking controls in response to stressful and alcohol-related
images (Sinha et al., 2008).
Sensitized responses to stress are apparent in brain imaging
studies. The extended amygdala and corticostriatal circuitry is
involved in both reward and affective processing. Medial pre-
frontal cortex, anterior and posterior cingulate, striatum, and
insula are associated with stress- and drug-cue-induced crav-
ing, which in turn are associated with increased susceptibil-
ity to relapse (Sinha and Li, 2007). Stress induction, using
guided imagery of personal stressful and neutral situations in
cocaine-dependent individuals and controls, resulted in increased
response within the dorsal striatum that correlated with increased
craving. Patients additionally demonstrated reduced activation in
anterior cingulate and prefrontal regions compared with controls
(Sinha et al., 2005). Using the same stress induction method,
and drug cue exposure, a later study demonstrated that guan-
facine, a α2 adrenoceptor agonist, increased prefrontal activ-
ity in response to induced stress and drug cue exposure, and
reduced craving (Fox et al., 2012). A study in recently detoxi-
fied alcoholic-dependent individuals demonstrated that an NK-1
receptor antagonist reduced brain response to negative images
in the inferior temporal gyrus, insula, and middle temporal
gyrus and reduced serum cortisol levels and alcohol cue-induced
cravings (George et al., 2008).
Anxiety/stress sensitivity is considered to maintain addiction
(Heilig and Koob, 2007), and increase susceptibility to relapse
during abstinence (Sinha, 2001; Duncan et al., 2007) in heroin
(Fatseas et al., 2011), alcohol (Sinha et al., 2008), and cocaine-
dependents (Karlsgodt et al., 2003).
IMPACT OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSES ON COGNITION IN
ADDICTION
These dysfunctions influence the behavior of addicted individ-
uals, tending to increase, and maintain drug-taking. In particu-
lar, emotional dysregulation and altered reward sensitivity may
underpin impulsive behavior and poor decision-making. Both
of these tendencies can be seen in the “real-world” behavior of
addicted individuals, but can also be studied using laboratory-
based paradigms.
AFFECTIVE IMPULSIVITY AND SUBSTANCE MISUSE
As has been outlined, drug dependence is associated with a rel-
ative enhancement of processing of drug-related stimuli at the
expense of natural rewards. This attentional bias is associated
with the emotional state of craving and impacts upon relapse vul-
nerability. Furthermore, changes occur in “anti-reward” systems
that result in negative emotional states maintain addiction via
negative reinforcement mechanisms. However, addiction is asso-
ciated with a loss of control over drug use which continues in
spite of individuals’ awareness of serious negative consequences.
Increased reward and anxiety sensitivity alone do not seem a
sufficient explanation for this persistent maladaptive behavior.
Instead there must be additional deficits in decision-making
and/or inhibiting maladaptive behaviors. These deficits may be
mediated by reward and anxiety sensitivity, but critically involve
these emotional factors exerting a detrimental effect on cognitive
function. The term “impulsivity” is often used to describe behav-
ior characterized by excessive approach with an additional failure
of effective inhibition (Hommer et al., 2011) and has consistently
been found to be associated with substance dependence (de Wit,
2009; Dalley et al., 2011). Impulsivity is a complex multifaceted
construct which has resulted in numerous additional definitions
such as, “the tendency to react rapidly or in unplanned ways
to internal or external stimuli without proper regard for nega-
tive consequences or inherent risks” (Shin et al., 2012), or “the
tendency to engage in inappropriate or maladaptive behaviors”
(de Wit, 2009).
These definitions reflect different types of impulsivity.
Examples include reflection impulsivity (action without adequate
evaluation of the situation), impulsive action (inadequate motor
inhibition), risky decision-making (impulsive choices of imme-
diate rewards over larger delayed ones) (Dalley et al., 2011),
and attentional impulsivity, or lack of perseverance (inability to
focus on a task or goal) (Cyders and Smith, 2008). In addition,
the recently defined constructs of positive and negative urgency
reflect the tendency to act rashly in response to extreme negative
or positive affect (Cyders and Smith, 2008). Whilst these varieties
of impulsivity involve different psychological processes, it is likely
that they interact to modulate behavior (Evenden, 1999).
Questionnaire measures of emotional impulsivity
Self-report questionnaires are frequently used to assess impul-
sivity. Distinctions have been made between measures of cog-
nitive impulsivity (reflection impulsivity, attentional impulsiv-
ity) and emotional impulsivity (positive and negative urgency)
(Fernandez-Serrano et al., 2012).
Deficits in cognitive impulsivity have been identified across
alcohol (Evren et al., 2012), heroin (Nielsen et al., 2012), and
cocaine addiction (Ersche et al., 2010b) using measures such as
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11) with higher scores predict-
ing greater drug use (Ersche et al., 2010b) and relapse (Evren
et al., 2012). Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that impair-
ments in emotional and behavioral regulation confer a risk for
the later development of substance abuse. The trait of behavioral
disinhibition in young adults, which reflects impulsive novelty-
seeking, was found to predict substance abuse 6 years later (Sher
et al., 2000). The construct of neurobehavioral disinhibition is
indexed by self-report measures of emotional regulation, par-
ent and teacher indicated measures of behavioral control, and
performance on tests of executive functioning. Neurobehavioral
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disinhibition in 10–12 years old has been shown to be consis-
tent in predicting later development of substance abuse in young
adulthood (Tarter et al., 2003; Kirisci et al., 2007).
Thus, cognitive impulsivity appears to be associated with
addiction, and may play a role in the development of substance
misuse. However, in this review, we will focus on emotional
impulsivity, which more closely reflects the interaction between
emotional and cognitive processes. Impulsivity defined as “the
inability to control behavior in the face of reward and/or pun-
ishment” is associated with increased substance use in young
adults. Both positive and negative reinforcementmotives are asso-
ciated with this impulsivity trait (Woicik et al., 2009), suggesting
that increased substance use may be related to an inability to
control behavior when experiencing either positive or negative
emotion. Both negative and positive urgency were found to be
higher in polysubstance users. Positive urgency scores correlated
with amount of cocaine use and binge drinking, whilst scores
on measures of reflection impulsivity did not differ from con-
trols (Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2010). In addition, both positive and
negative urgency have been shown to be correlated with prob-
lem drinking in undergraduate students (Cyders et al., 2007), and
to differentiate substance abusers from controls (Cyders et al.,
2007). In a study investigating impulsivity dimensions, higher
scores onmeasures of reflection impulsivity, attentional impulsiv-
ity, and negative urgency all differentiated substance dependents
from controls, although negative urgency was found to be the best
predictor of alcohol, drug, social, legal, medical, and employment
problems (Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007a).
Although impulsivity is a multifaceted construct, comprising
different psychological processes, failings across all dimensions
of impulse control occur in substance dependence. However,
findings above highlight a specific role for emotion, both posi-
tive and negative, in producing impulsive behaviors. Emotional
impulsivity traits appear distinct from other impulsivity traits
and particularly pertinent for dependence, reliably differentiat-
ing substance users from controls, and also predicting poorer
outcomes in dependent individuals.
Behavioral measures of affective impulsivity
Self-report measures rely upon the accuracy of the individual’s
introspection. Behavioral measures offer an index of impulsiv-
ity that is free of subject bias. There are two broad categories of
behavioral impulsivity measures. One is characterized by deficits
in the ability to inhibit a motor response, referred to as behav-
ioral inhibition. The other is associated with a deficit in inhibition
that is motivationally driven and is associated with reward pro-
cessing (Castellanos-Ryan et al., 2011). Deficits in behavioral
inhibition have been found in substance dependence (Forman
et al., 2004; Hester and Garavan, 2004; Noel et al., 2007; Fu
et al., 2008), consistent with the role of cognitive impulsivity in
addiction. However, here we will focus on reward-based impul-
sivity, reflecting the impact of emotional processing on cognitive
performance.
A common behavioral measure of impulsivity is the delay
discounting task which measures the degree of temporal dis-
counting. Temporal discounting describes the process by which
the subjective value of a reward decreases as a function of delay
to that reward (Bickel et al., 2007). Participants are faced with the
choice of a small immediate reward, or a larger delayed reward;
choosing the smaller immediate reward indicates a higher degree
of impulsivity. Increased discounting of larger delayed rewards
has been found in heroin- (Madden et al., 1997; Kirby et al., 1999;
Kirby and Petry, 2004), cocaine- (Coffey et al., 2003; Kirby and
Petry, 2004), and alcohol (Petry, 2001; Bjork et al., 2004a;Mitchell
et al., 2007) -dependent individuals. Drug rewards are discounted
at an even higher rate than monetary rewards (Madden et al.,
1997, 1999; Kirby et al., 1999). Enhanced discounting is also seen
during mild opiate withdrawal, possibly reflecting the emergence
of negative affect states during withdrawal (Koob and Le Moal,
2005). There is evidence that delayed discounting is influenced by
emotional state in healthy controls, with positive mood induction
increasing discounting of larger delayed rewards in extraverted
individuals (Hirsh et al., 2010). This effect, reflecting a complex
interaction between reward sensitivity, emotional state, and cog-
nition, does not appear to have been tested in drug users, although
it is an obvious area for study, given that all three intersecting
factors are abnormal in addiction.
Emotional influences on decision-making can be measured
empirically, using tasks where higher level cognitive process-
ing is regulated by emotion and feeling (Bechara, 2005). The
Iowa Gambling Task was developed to test “emotional” decision-
making in a laboratory setting for patients with ventromedial
prefrontal cortex damage (Bechara et al., 1994). This task presents
choices between large monetary gains (but with associated even
larger losses, such that the overall long-term outcome is loss)
and small monetary gains (but with associated smaller losses,
such that the overall long term outcome is gain) (Bechara et al.,
1994). Impairments in this task, in the form of disadvanta-
geous choices despite rising losses, have been found in cocaine
(Stout et al., 2004; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007b; Cunha et al.,
2011), heroin (Petry et al., 1998; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007b),
and alcohol addiction (Bechara et al., 2001; Noel et al., 2007).
In the Iowa Gambling Task, reward outcome probabilities are
unknown, therefore participants have to learn reward contingen-
cies. This places high demands on “cold” executive processing as
well as “hot” emotional processing that may bias decision-making
toward high rewards in spite of the negative consequences. The
task thus provides an ideal test of how emotional processing
impacts upon cold cognition, but does not dissociate the con-
tribution of affective and cognitive processes to any deficits. The
Cambridge Gamble (Rogers et al., 1999a) and the Cambridge
Risk Task (Rogers et al., 1999b) require less learning and work-
ing memory processing, as outcome probabilities are presented
explicitly. Studies with the Cambridge tasks also find deficits
in opiate (Rogers et al., 1999a; Fishbein et al., 2007; Passetti
et al., 2008), stimulant (Rogers et al., 1999a,b), and alcohol-
dependent subjects (Bowden-Jones et al., 2005; Lawrence et al.,
2009). Furthermore, poorer decision-making confers a greater
risk of relapse in opiate- (Passetti et al., 2008) and alcohol
(Bowden-Jones et al., 2005) -dependent individuals.
Bechara et al. demonstrated an enhanced affective response
to anticipated and actual gains during the IGT in substance
dependent individuals in the form of elevated skin conductance,
and a reduced skin conductance response before making a risky
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decision (Bechara et al., 2002; Bechara and Damasio, 2002). They
concluded that hypersensitivity to reward and an impaired abil-
ity to use affective signals to guide behavior, underlie impaired
decision-making in these individuals. In support of reward hyper-
sensitivity underlying IGT deficits in substance abusers, measures
of novelty-seeking have been found to predict poor IGT perfor-
mance in alcohol-dependent subjects (Noel et al., 2011). Note that
hypersensitivity to rewards in this context is somewhat at odds
with the findings from the monetary incentive delay task reported
earlier. Money can be considered to be a drug cue (Garavan
et al., 2000), as it is necessary for obtaining drugs, however, only
when presented in sufficient quantities. Gambling tasks typically
involve presentations of much larger and more salient sums than
the monetary incentive delay task.
Impaired decision-making in the face of motivationally
salient outcomes is a core deficit in addiction, with individ-
uals opting for immediate rewards, despite negative longer-
term outcomes. Substance dependence involves the choice of
immediate drug reward despite negative long term conse-
quences (e.g., health, family, economic, and criminal problems)
and these deficits thus provide an extremely plausible model
of how motivational factors negatively influence real world
decision-making.
Studies demonstrate the impact of emotional state on
decision-making
Specifically assessing the influence of emotional processing on
decision-making, studies in healthy volunteers have demon-
strated that high levels of trait anxiety (Miu et al., 2008), negative
affect (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007), sensation-seeking (van Honk
et al., 2002; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007), and stress sensitivity (van
den Bos et al., 2009) are predictive of poor decision-making on
the IGT.
High levels of negative affect, anxiety/stress sensitivity and
sensation-seeking in substance dependent individuals may there-
fore contribute to observed deficits on decision-making tasks.
Reward and stress mechanisms are considered to be important
mechanisms underlying relapse (Stewart, 2008), suggesting these
emotional traits impair real life decision-making. Studies directly
assessing the role of emotional states on decision-making in opi-
ate addiction have shown that trait and state anxiety are negatively
correlated with performance on the IGT (Lemenager et al., 2011).
Furthermore, stress induction using the Trier Social Stress Test,
was shown to produce a significant deterioration in IGT perfor-
mance in long term abstinence and newly abstinent heroin users,
but not in comparison subjects. Treatment with the B adreno-
cepter antagonist propranolol blocked the deleterious effect of
stress on IGT performance, supporting the role of the noradren-
ergic system in the generation of negative emotional states in
substance dependence (Zhang et al., 2011). A later study from the
same group found that drug cue exposure increased craving and
impaired performance of the IGT in long term and newly absti-
nent heroin users (Wang et al., 2012), indicating that conditioned
emotional responses impair decision-making. Interestingly, in a
group of heavy drinkers, the induction of anticipatory stress (by
making participants believe they were required to carry out an
embarrassing speech) before the IGT task improved performance
of the IGT. This effect was attributed to a greater sensitivity to
losses after stress induction (Gullo and Stieger, 2011). Similarly,
the induction of negative affect via exposure to negative images
from IAPS, improved performance on the IGT task in cocaine-
dependent participants (Fernandez-Serrano et al., 2011). These
latter studies suggest stress induction can have bivalent effects on
decision-making.
The reviewed studies demonstrate that decision-making is
influenced by both trait and state affective processes in addic-
tion. A deleterious effect of both trait and state anxiety was
found in opiate addiction, although the induction of negative
affect states improved performance in heavy alcohol drinkers
and cocaine-dependent subjects. The tendency of stress in opi-
ate users to bias decision-making in the favor of immediate
rewards at the expense of long term goals is consistent with the
finding that enhanced stress reactivity increases relapse suscep-
tibility (Karlsgodt et al., 2003; Sinha et al., 2008; Fatseas et al.,
2011). By contrast, stress induced enhancement of decision-
making in cocaine and alcohol-dependent individuals seems at
odds with the predicted roles of stress in addiction (Koob, 2008),
and warrants further study with tasks designed to probe specific
sub-processes.
One explanation for these contradictory findings may be
the notion that stress can have differential effects on decision-
making depending upon the degree of stress experienced. The
stress response is an adaptive response to enable organisms to
adequately deal with threats within the environment, however,
an excessive or unduly persistent stress response can be detri-
mental (McEwen, 2007). It has been suggested that a certain
levels of stress can be optimum for decision-making—according
to the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) (see sec-
tion “Influence of Somatic Markers” for a detailed description
of this hypothesis), emotions can facilitate decision-making by
rapidly signaling the prospective consequences of an action
and accordingly assists the selection of the most advantageous
response (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Anxiety is considered to
increase arousal and sensitivity to stimuli signaling punishment
(McNaughton and Corr, 2004). Gullo and Stieger (2011) demon-
strated that stress induction increased attention toward losses
in heavy drinkers. Induced moderate stress/negative affect may
improve IGT performance by enhancing punishment sensitivity
(Fernandez-Serrano et al., 2011). More intense emotion however,
may have a deleterious effect on decision-making. It has been sug-
gested that excessive stress, anxiety and worry require emotional
regulation, which may tax cognitive resources (Tice et al., 2001)
and therefore impair performance on decision-making tasks (Miu
et al., 2008). High levels of stress may produce a high level of
“background” emotion that “drowns out” affective signals during
performance of decision-making tasks (Gullo and Stieger, 2011).
A related explanation for the different findings of the impact
of stress on decision-making may be different methods used
for stress induction resulting in different levels of stress in each
study. Zhang et al. induced stress using the Trier Social Stress
Test, where participants are asked to carry out a short presen-
tation and then perform difficult mathematical subtractions, all
whilst being filmed. Gullo and Stieger induced stress by inform-
ing participants they would have to carry out an embarrassing
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presentation, although the participants did not actually do so.
Fernandez-Serrano et al. induced negative affect by viewing neg-
ative and aversive pictures. It therefore could be argued that the
levels of stress induced by the actual carrying out of the stressful
procedures of the Trier Social Stress Test were greater than those
induced by the anticipation of carrying out stressful procedures
or by viewing negative pictures.
Another factor that may influence task performance may be
due to differences in study populations. Lemenager and Zhang
studied opiate-dependent individuals, whereas Gullo and Steiger
and Fernandez-Serrano studied a group of heavy drinking under-
graduate students (who were drinking harmful levels of alcohol)
and cocaine-dependent subjects respectively. Anxiety sensitive
traits have been shown to be more specifically associated with
heroin dependence than cocaine use (Lejuez et al., 2006). Whilst
anxiety sensitive traits have been associated with alcohol depen-
dence (Norton et al., 1997), this trait was not found to be
associated with heavy drinking in young adults, rather, heavy
drinking was more associated with sensation-seeking in this sam-
ple (Woicik et al., 2009). It is therefore likely that baseline anxiety
levels and susceptibility to stress were higher in the studies of
Lemengaer and Zhang than those of Fernandez-Serrano et al., and
Gullo and Stieger. Therefore, different procedures and different
populations (Figure 4) may combine to account for discrepancies
in this literature.
THE IMPACT OF EMOTION ON IMPULSIVE ACTION AND
DECISION-MAKING
The preceding sections have reviewed evidence of emotional
disturbances and impaired decision-making in substance depen-
dence. Decision-making involves processes of deciding upon the
most appropriate actions to take after consideration of the pre-
dicted value of an action (Redish et al., 2008), and the automatic
FIGURE 4 | Hypothetical relationship of the effect of stress on
cognitive performance in substance dependence according to different
trait levels of stress sensitivity. Mild stress improves performance in
those of low and medium AS traits by enhancing arousal and sensitivity to
punishment signals. Increasing stress results in an increasing need for
affect regulation, thus resulting in reduced task-related cognitive resource
allocation and impaired performance. High trait AS is associated with
impaired decision-making performance before stress induction (Lemenager
et al., 2011) and thus further increases in stress are likely to lead to further
significant task impairments. Abbreviations: AS, Anxiety Sensitivity.
selection of actions that an agent has learnt, through past expe-
rience, delivers high valued outcomes. The predicted value of
an action can be defined in terms of the expected reward it
is expected to elicit (after consideration of the probability of,
and delay to, receiving the reward), minus any costs associated
with the action (Daw et al., 2005). The following sections will
review how decision-making can bemodulated by emotional pro-
cesses, and how dysregulation of these processes in substance
dependence contributes to decision-making deficits.
Systems involved in action selection
Primate and rodent studies suggest systems controlling behav-
ior can be separated into planning and habit systems. Planning
systems (also referred to as deliberative, cognitive, reflective or
executive systems) are “goal-directed” systems that allow an agent
to consider the possible consequences or outcomes of its actions
to guide behavior. Habit systems mediate behaviors that are trig-
gered in response to certain stimuli or situations but without
consideration of the consequences. Given the differential consid-
eration of action outcomes, behaviors controlled by the planning
system are sensitive to outcome devaluation, whereas habitual
behaviors are not (Niv et al., 2006; Redish et al., 2008). In addi-
tion, emotional circuit activation in response to a biologically
significant event, or the cues that predict it, can elicit a series
of evolutionary hard-wired Pavlovian actions such as approach,
freezing and fleeing arising from an expectancy generated by the
CS-UCS association. Brain areas underlying Pavlovian responses
include the amygdala, which identifies the emotional significance
or value of external stimuli, and the ventral striatum, which
mediates motivational influences on instrumental responding
(Cardinal et al., 2002), and their connections to motor circuits
(van derMeer et al., 2012). Thus, it has been argued that emotions
constitute a decision-making system in their own right, exerting
a dominant effect on choice in situations of opportunity or threat
(Seymour and Dolan, 2008; van der Meer et al., 2012).
There are computational differences in how the habitual and
planning systems decide upon appropriate actions to take. The
process of action selection in the planning system is complex.
It involves searching through and predicting the possible con-
sequences of actions. Consequences are evaluated online, taking
current needs and motivational state, time, effort, and probability
of receiving the desired outcome into consideration before a deci-
sion is made (Redish et al., 2008; van der Meer et al., 2012). Due
to the numerous searches of different actions and their potential
consequences, this process is slow, requiring extensive cognitive
processing. Action selection processes are flexible, allowing an
organism adapt behavior to changing environments and needs.
The habit system chooses actions based upon stored associations
of their values from past experience; through training, an organ-
ism learns the best action to take in a certain situation. Upon
recognition of the situation again this “best action” will auto-
matically be initiated, without consideration of consequences of
such an action. This process is very fast but inflexible, unable to
adapt quickly to changes in the value of outcomes (Daw et al.,
2005; Redish et al., 2008). Under appropriate conditions, habit-
ual actions may be overridden by planning systems (Redish et al.,
2008).
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The influence of emotional processes on action selection
Emotional processing involves detecting and responding to salient
challenges and opportunities within the environment to enable
an organism to thrive and survive. Key brain circuits involved
in these processes are the reward and stress circuitry that are
involved in reinforcement, motivation, and defence. In the fol-
lowing section we will argue that brain emotional systems have a
key role in decision-making.
Influence of emotion in the planning system: neural
substrates. As described, the planning system selects actions
after consideration of potential outcomes, and is sensitive to
changes in outcome value. Therefore, the planning system will be
influenced by brain areas involved in evaluating and predicting
outcome values (Redish et al., 2008; Balleine and O’Doherty,
2010). The OFC of the planning system has been demonstrated
to be involved in the valuation of reward outcome (Elliott et al.,
2003) and the predictive value of CS (Tremblay and Schultz,
1999), therefore emotional processing by the OFC is integral to
the planning system. The OFC additionally works in concert with
subcortical emotional systems in the valuation of outcomes; the
amygdala is considered to be a key neural substrate for outcome
valuation due to its sensory and hypothalamic afferents which
allow for the integration of specific sensory features of outcomes
with emotional feedback (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). The
basolateral amygdala also mediates the influence of CS on goal
directed behavior by allowing a CS to access the current value
of the UCS that it predicts (Seymour and Dolan, 2008; Cardinal
et al., 2002). Basolateral amygdala lesions rendered the instru-
mental performance of rats insensitive to outcome devaluation
(Balleine et al., 2003) and blockade of opioid receptor signaling
in the basolateral amygdala with naloxone prevented the effect
of food deprivation to increase food-seeking (Wassum et al.,
2009). Both of these results suggest that disrupting basolateral
amygdala functions prevents the use of new outcome values
to guide behavior within the planning system. Other neural
structures assumed to be important in the valuation of outcomes
include the ventral pallidum, encoding the hedonic impact of
rewards (Tindell et al., 2004), and the ventral striatum that
appears to have a role in encoding reward value (Schultz et al.,
1997; McDannald et al., 2011).
Pavlovian CS can influence instrumental performance by a
process known Pavlovian-instrumental-transfer (PIT). A reward
associated CS can enhance instrumental responding specifically
for the reward that it associated with (outcome specific PIT) or it
may enhance responding generally by enhancing arousal (general
PIT) (Corbit and Balleine, 2011). PIT is considered to reflect an
effect of increased incentive motivation to increase response vigor
(Everitt and Robbins, 2005). PIT depends upon the amygdala and
nucleus accumbens, with the latter thought to have a role in trans-
lating motivation into action (Cardinal et al., 2002; Balleine and
O’Doherty, 2010).
Influence of emotion within the habit system. Behaviors con-
trolled by the habit system are carried out without consideration
of outcome value, but instead reflect automatic responses to a
stimulus or situation. As we have seen, emotional processing
appears to have an important role in integrating homeostatic
needs in the calculation of outcome values, creating incentive
motivation toward highly values outcomes. It might therefore
be expected that incentive motivation would not affect habit-
ual behaviors that act independently of outcome value. However,
this is not the case: shifts in primary motivation (e.g., from
hunger to satiety) have been shown to affect the vigor of habit-
ual actions. This is thought to be due to a “generalized drive”
effect that is distinct from specific outcomes (Niv et al., 2006),
suggesting there is a general activating effect of motivation state.
Habitual actions are additionally influenced by Pavlovian pre-
dictors of rewards (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010)—overtraining
actions that increase insensitivity to outcome value (i.e., reflect-
ing a transition from planning system to habit system control)
render actions more sensitive to appetitive CS effects on response
vigor (Belin et al., 2009). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated
that a CS continues to influence instrumental actions that result
in the outcome it predicts, even after the earlier devaluation of
the outcome (Rescorla, 1994), suggesting both general PIT and
outcome specific PIT effects influence habitual actions. Thus,
whilst outcome values do not affect habitual actions, general shifts
in motivation and Pavlovian cue values, encoded by the ventral
striatum and OFC, do in a manner that is independent of rep-
resentation of current outcome value (Balleine and O’Doherty,
2010).
Influence of somatic markers. An important component of the
emotional response is changes within the internal milieu and
viscera of the body such as a release of hormones and increase
in heart rate (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). These physiological
changes within the body are relayed back to the brain with areas
such as the insula and the somatosensory cortices suggested to
convert these physiological signals into subjective feeling states
(Damasio, 1994). Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis high-
lights the specific role of these physiological signals arising from
the body in the guidance of behavior (Damasio, 1994). The term
“somatic state” is used to describe the brain and body responses to
UCS and CS (referred to as “primary inducers”). Once a somatic
state has been triggered by a primary inducer and experienced
at least once, a representation of this somatic state is formed.
The theory proposes that somatic state can be “reactivated” by
thoughts and memories of real or imagined emotional events
(referred to as secondary inducers’). This reactivation of somatic
states by secondary inducers is proposed to guide future decisions
by signaling the prospective consequences of an action.
Brain areas important for generating somatic states from
primary inducers include the amygdala and effector struc-
tures such as the hypothalamus, autonomic brain stem nuclei,
the ventral striatum and periacqueductal grey (PAG). The
medial orbitofrontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (defined as
VMPFC) is responsible for triggering somatic states from sec-
ondary inducers. It is proposed the VMPFC couples recalled or
imagined scenarios (supported by the hippocampus and DLPFC)
with brain areas important for the representation of somatic
states within the insula, somatosensory cortices, posterior cin-
gulate/precuneus region. Somatic states may influence decision-
making with or without conscious knowledge in the striatum and
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in the prefrontal cortex respectively (Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara,
2009).
Distracting effect of emotions. Emotion can guide decision-
making when it is integral to the task at hand, emotional
responses that are unrelated, or excessive, can be detrimen-
tal (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Dorsal prefrontal regions are
involved in the regulation of affective states (Phillips et al.,
2003a). Excessive emotion is likely to require regulation by
these areas (Phillips et al., 2003b; Amat et al., 2005; Robbins,
2005). Dorsal prefrontal regions are additionally important
in decision-making and inhibitory control, thus high levels
of emotion that require regulation may limit resources avail-
able for these functions, which may contribute to deficits in
decision-making.
The effects of emotional processing in substance dependence
Given the crucial role of emotions in the processes of decision-
making as described above, along with evidence that both craving
and stress are significant drivers of relapse (Weiss, 2005; Sinha,
2007), it follows that dysregulation of emotional processing may
contribute to the observed decision-making deficits observed in
substance dependent individuals.
Effects within the planning system. As reviewed, the brain’s
reward system has a heightened sensitivity to conditioned drug
stimuli. Various mechanisms are proposed to underlie this effect
including pre-morbid vulnerabilities in brain emotional systems
and the action of drugs of abuse within brain emotional systems.
One mechanism is drug-induced sensitization of dopamine neu-
rons that may act to enhance the incentive salience of drug cues,
increasing “wanting” of drug outcomes (Robinson and Berridge,
1993). Given that CSs reflect the value of the reward that they
predict (Seymour and Dolan, 2008), an additional explanation
of the heightened response to drug cues is due to overvaluing of
drugs of abuse within the reward system (Redish et al., 2008).
This overvaluing has been attributed to an increased hedonic
impact of drugs of abuse, via enhanced opioid receptor sig-
naling (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008; Redish et al., 2008).
Pharmacological actions of drugs of abuse to increase dopamine
release in the nucleus accumbens have also been suggested to
mediate their pleasurable effects (Volkow et al., 2011). Therefore,
dopamine mediated increases in hedonic impact may also con-
tribute to overvaluation. However, the role of dopamine in drug
“liking” has been questioned (Berridge, 2007). Drug induced
dopamine release may also influence decision-making via effects
on Pavlovian learning. Learning of Pavlovian values is mediated
by the difference between what is expected after presentation of a
CS, and the outcome actually received, referred to as a prediction
error. This prediction error can either be positive, indicating a
better outcome than expected or negative, indicating a worse out-
come than expected (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010). Prediction
errors result in modification of the predictive outcome value
assigned to a CS. Dopamine neuron firing appears to encode
prediction errors (Schultz, 1998), suggesting phasic dopamine
signaling may be the teaching signal that enables the learning of
Pavlovian associations. Therefore, increases in phasic dopamine
release produced by drugs of abuse, may signal a positive “bet-
ter than expected” prediction error, resulting in an increase in
the predictive outcome value assigned to drug cues (Redish et al.,
2008). However, the role of dopamine in learning is still under
debate, as it is suggested that dopamine neuron firing is not the
teaching signal that causes learning, but instead is a consequence
of learning that occurs elsewhere (Berridge, 2007).
Homeostatic and allostatic changes associated with chronic
drug use may result in withdrawal symptoms, excessive anxi-
ety sensitivity, and depressive symptoms. This may result in an
overvaluing of drugs of abuse that satisfy a homeostatic need,
such as immediate withdrawal, anxiety and depressive symptom
relief (Redish et al., 2008; Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara, 2009).
Increased drug use to alleviate negative emotional states is sug-
gested to underlie the compulsive nature of drug use in substance
dependence. Compulsive disorders are associated with anxiety
and stress before committing a compulsive act, and relief from
that stress by carrying out the act (Koob and Volkow, 2010).
In addition, allostatic changes within the reward system appear
to have the effect of undervaluing natural rewards, thus further
biasing decision-making in favor of drug rewards.
As reviewed, the planning system guides decisions after con-
sidering the outcome value of actions, in the context of current
needs. Therefore enhanced outcome values of drug use may bias
decision-making systems in favor of drug use. The amygdala,
which plays a key role in detecting the emotional significance of
a CS and generating appropriate responses, mediates the influ-
ence of overvalued drug outcomes on drug-seeking behavior after
exposure to drug-related stimuli (Bechara, 2005). According to
the somatic marker hypothesis, the VMPFC is involved in guid-
ing behavior in line with long term goals (such as of abstinence)
by evoking somatic states from thoughts or memories.
In addition to being important for the generation of somatic
states, prefrontal regions are also crucial for cognitive and motor
inhibitory control (Aron, 2007). A consistent finding of neu-
roimaging studies of decision-making in substance dependence is
hypoactivation of the prefrontal cortex (Bolla et al., 2003; Tanabe
et al., 2007; Bjork et al., 2008b), although hyperactivation in the
lateral OFC has also been found in opiate and amphetamine-
dependent individuals (Ersche et al., 2005). Chronic drug use is
consistently associated with VPFC, DLPFC and ACC gray mat-
ter loss in cocaine and alcohol dependence (Fein et al., 2002a,b;
Makris et al., 2008; Fein et al., 2010; Goldstein and Volkow, 2011;
Ersche et al., 2011) and reduced prefrontal neuronal viability in
opiate dependence (Haselhorst et al., 2002; Yucel et al., 2007).
VPFC and DLPFC loss have been shown to predict both impaired
performance on the IGT (Tanabe et al., 2009) and preference for
immediate gratification in delay discounting tasks (Bjork et al.,
2009) Such findings suggest that the prefrontal regions of the
planning system is impaired in substance dependence, compro-
mising both the ability to generate affective states relating to
long term goals (Bechara and Damasio, 2005) and the ability to
exert executive inhibitory control over drug-seeking thoughts and
actions (Goldstein and Volkow, 2011).
Dorsal prefrontal regions are involved in the regulation of
affective states (Phillips et al., 2003a). Therefore excessive anx-
iety or craving would require regulation by these areas. Studies
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 101 | 16
Murphy et al. Detrimental effects of emotion in substance dependence
have shown dorsal prefrontal regions to be important in regulat-
ing craving and reducing amygdala activity in cue induced craving
paradigms (Brody et al., 2007; Kober et al., 2010). Considering
these prefrontal regions are important for decision-making, crav-
ing and anxiety regulation would limit the resources available for
effective decision-making within the planning system.
Effects within the habit system. A transition from control over
drug-seeking by planning systems to control by habit systems
has been proposed to underlie compulsive drug use (Everitt
and Robbins, 2005). As reviewed, Pavlovian cues have motiva-
tional impacts upon habitual actions in a manner that is inde-
pendent of representation of current outcome values (Balleine
and O’Doherty, 2010). Therefore, drug cues have the ability to
increase drug-seeking actions controlled by habit systems. This
transition to habitual control in substance dependence means
drug-associated cues come to enhance drug-seeking, via PIT
mechanisms, without consideration of the consequences of drug-
seeking actions.
Preclinical studies have demonstrated that the transition from
goal-directed to habitual behavior is associated with a change
from dopamine release in the ventral striatum to the dorsal
striatum in response to drug associated stimuli (Everitt et al.,
2008). PET studies have demonstrated cue induced dopamine
release to occur in the dorsal, but not ventral, striatum of cocaine
(Volkow et al., 2006) and heroin-dependent individuals (Zijlstra
et al., 2008), providing evidence that habitual system control may
underlie compulsive drug-seeking in these dependent groups.
The mechanism of this transition to dorsal striatal control
appears to be a dopamine-dependent mechanism, and thus drug-
induced sensitization of dopamine neurons, and pharmacological
action of drugs of abuse to increase striatal dopamine release,
may accelerate this transition (Everitt et al., 2008). Prediction
error dopamine neurons innervate the dorsal as well as the ven-
tral striatum (Everitt and Robbins, 2005) and thus drug induced
positive prediction errorsmay result in overvaluing of actions that
lead to drug use, enhancing the consolidation of these stimulus-
response relationships (Everitt et al., 2008; Redish et al., 2008).
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests a role of stress in shifting
goal-directed control to habitual control of behavior (Schwabe
and Wolf, 2011). This effect appears to be mediated by the
action of both cortisol and noradrenaline (Schwabe et al., 2010).
Therefore sensitization of the brain’s stress system occurring with
chronic drug use is likely to contribute to the development of
habitual drug-seeking.
A shift in the control of drug-seeking to habitual system
control is disadvantageous, potentially reflecting a “loss of con-
trol” over drug-seeking that is insensitive to devaluation of
drug rewards. This may explain the persistence of drug use
despite explicit knowledge of negative consequences, which under
goal-directed control, should reduce the propensity for drug-
seeking. Whilst there is evidence that automatic, habitual actions
may be overridden by controlled, planning-like systems (Redish
et al., 2008), impaired function of prefrontal planning system
regions observed in substance dependence suggest the ability to
regain control of drug-seeking may be compromised in substance
dependent individuals.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that substance dependence is associated with sig-
nificant emotional dysregulation that influences cognition via
numerous mechanisms. This dysregulation comes in the form
of heightened reward sensitivity to drug-related stimuli, reduced
sensitivity to natural reward stimuli, and heightened sensitiv-
ity of the brain’s stress systems that respond to threats. Such
disturbances have the effect of biasing attentional processing
toward drugs with powerful rewarding and/or anxiolytic effects
at the expense of natural rewards, resulting in profound nega-
tive effects on clinical outcome. Emotion dysregulation can also
result in impulsive actions and influence decision-making, via a
range of mechanisms. Overvaluing of drug rewards may enhance
goal directed drug-seeking behaviors controlled by planning sys-
tems. Furthermore, learned Pavlovian values associated with drug
stimuli motivate drug-seeking controlled by habit systems, result-
ing in automatic drug-seeking when exposed to drug cues and
environments. Actions of drugs within brain reward and stress
systems may additionally accelerate the transition from plan-
ning system to habit system control over drug-seeking. Such
accelerations of this transition are extremely detrimental clini-
cally, as drug-seeking behaviors under habit system control are
impulsive, initiated without consideration of potential negative
consequences of drug use. This has implications for treatment of
substance dependence. Psychological therapies aimed at focusing
upon the negative consequences of drug use or punitive measures
aimed to reduce drug use, will be more effective when drug-
seeking is under planning system control, but possibly ineffective
for drug use that is under habitual control. Reducing exposure
to drug associated cues and contexts is crucial in reducing habit-
ual drug-seeking, although this may not be practical. An exciting
area of research that may prove promising for the treatment of
habitual drug-seeking is to effectively “wipe” drug memories via
the combination of drug memory reconsolidation and extinction
processes (Xue et al., 2012).
Impulsive drug-seeking and insensitivity to negative conse-
quences are worsened by impairments of prefrontal systems that
serve to generate “warning” somatic emotional signals when con-
sidering drug use. This result in the amygdala dominating somatic
signaling, acting to incentivize drug-seeking by creating expectan-
cies of large rewards after drug cue exposure. Extreme emotion
requiring regulation from frontal brain regions, such as exces-
sive anxiety associated with substance dependence, may further
impair decision-making within the planning system by limit-
ing available resources that can be allocated to assessing possible
consequences of each action. There is likely to be significant vari-
ability in the extent to which these distinct, but inter-related
mechanisms confer vulnerability to developing long-term addic-
tions. This variability is influenced by differences in the pharma-
cological actions of the drugs abused, pre-morbid individual trait
differences, and differences in the environments of drug users.
We have outlined evidence that emotional processing signif-
icantly impairs cognition in substance dependence. Emotionally
influenced cognitive impairments have serious negative effects on
clinical outcome, with both attentional bias and decision-making
deficits being predictive of drug relapse. However, emotional
processing has evolved to enable an organism to take advantage of
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opportunities, and effectively cope with challenges within the
environment. The influence of emotion is clearly detrimental
in substance dependence, and many of the detrimental effects
observed are due to the ability of drugs of abuse to mimic the
effects of stimuli or events that have survival significance. Drugs
of abuse effectively trick the brain’s emotional systems into think-
ing that they have survival significance, resulting in their high
valuation and overvaluing of actions that lead to drug use. The
biasing of cognition in favor of the procurement of highly val-
ued substances is an entirely adaptive process. Unfortunately,
for substance dependent individuals, the most highly valued
substances (drugs) are devoid of positive survival significance,
instead having a significant negative impact upon survival.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although the current review focuses on drug dependence, the
study of non-substance addictions may help improve understand-
ing of addiction. Investigation of these maladaptive behaviors
allows us to explore fundamental mechanisms of addiction, with-
out the confounding neurotoxic effects of substance use (Bechara,
2003; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2008). Pathological gambling and
other so-called “behavioral addictions,” involving activities such
as playing computer games, eating and shopping, appear to share
some common mechanisms with substance dependence (Shaffer
et al., 2004; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2008). Behavioral addictions are
associated with emotional and cognitive dysfunctions within the
reward (Potenza, 2008; Balodis et al., 2012) and stress systems
(Meyer et al., 2000; Moodie and Finnigan, 2005) as well as in
impulsive and decision-making processes (Bechara, 2003) which
negatively impact on outcome (Elman et al., 2010). Therefore fur-
ther work on a generic “addiction endophenotype” is warranted.
It is also important to emphasize the need for future investi-
gations into the differences between different substance depen-
dences, particularly in relation to vulnerability to dependence.
It is likely that drugs with different pharmacological properties
have distinct actions on brain reward and stress systems. However,
studies are typically confounded by polydrug use in the UK and
other western countries. Studies of single drug addiction may be
more feasible in countries where polydrug use is less prevalent.
Substance dependence research would also greatly benefit from
longitudinal studies assessing factors conferring risk for initial
substance use; how these factors relate to the subsequence devel-
opment of dependence; how these factors change within the
course of long term dependence; and how these factors impact
upon outcome. It is likely that each “stage” of drug use is asso-
ciated with specific cognitive mechanisms, but they are all likely
to be characterized by dysregulated emotional processes influ-
encing behavior and cognition. There is also a need for more
sophisticated assessments of emotion processing and decision-
making, particularly building on recent advances in understand-
ing brain and behavioral mechanisms of socioeconomic decisions
and social cognition.
Longitudinal studies will inform treatment development, par-
ticularly of therapies targeting prevention in individuals at high-
risk. As we have emphasized in this review, once heavy drug use is
initiated, changes within structures involved in reward, stress and
executive functioning create a reinforcing cycle which is extremely
difficult to break.However, treatment strategies based on emotion
regulation and strengthening cognitive control processes in high-
risk individuals could potentially prevent the cycle developing,
and therefore holds enormous promise in preventing addiction
and its many associated harms.
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